My paper was initially inspired by Wilson's program in the late 1970s, which included setting rigorous foundations for notions like perfect competition and rational expectations equilibrium using game theory. His 1977 paper "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition" pioneered this area. In it, he used a limiting argument to show that the winning bid in an auction could be a consistent estimator of the value of the good being sold, even when no single bidder's information could lead to a similarly accurate estimate.
What I couldn't have known at the time was that the technical issues I began to study in this paper would become be a recurrent research theme for me. This next development for me began at a seminar dinner, when Eric Maskin asked me what my model would look like in a Harsanyi-like formulation, in which the only random variables in the models were ones that some player observed. Like Wilson, I had used an unobserved "common value" element both to characterize the distribution of the conditionally independent types and as part of the specification of the individual bidder payoffs. Answering Maskin's question fed into my paper with Robert Weber (1982) , in which we developed our "general symmetric model," which put all the bidders' types directly into a valuation function. We introduced the notion of affiliation of the joint density function f (x 1 , . . . , x N , v) to replace the twin assumptions about conditional independence and the mlr property of f (x i |v).
Some time after that -I can't recall exactly when, Wilson explained Tarski's fixed point theorem to me. He showed his trademark excitement, suggesting that because lattices played a role in affiliation as well as in Tarski's theorem, there might be a connection. Affiliation is indeed a lattice condition, equivalent to the condition that the logarithm of the joint density, ln f (·) , is supermodular. Later, these lattice concepts would support analyses with John Roberts (1990a,b) of manufacturing systems and strategic complementarity, with Bengt Holmstrom (1994) of incentive systems, and with Chris Shannon (1994) of generalized comparative statics methods.
Quite mysteriously, auction and lattice ideas came together again when Wilson and I worked together on the fcc spectrum auction design. What we had called "back-up strategies" in our original presentations to the fcc wound up corresponding formally to the case of auctions when goods are substitutes. The condition of "substitutes" is mathematically identical to the condition that the bidder expenditure functions are supermodular. The monotonic auction process, with its monotonically rising prices, is simply a process to maximize the supermodular net expenditure function, in that way finding a competitive equilibrium.
There was something quite profound in Bob's advice and direction focusing on market design issues and lattice techniques. Twenty five years later, after spending so much of my career building on these few ideas, it is hard to imagine what my scholarly life would have been like without Bob's influence.
